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Soeharto's "New Order" Government, which came to power in 1966 in the wake of an abortive Communist coup, is a limited representative government in which the military plays a dominant role. Soeharto's Government has organized three of the four national elections held since independence. Soeharto won indirect election to his fourth five-year term as president in March 1983.

The world's fifth most populous nation, Indonesia contains a wide diversity of ethnic, social, linguistic and religious groups. The national social and political ideology, "pancasila," emphasizes decisionmaking through a process of consultation and consensus, a process growing out of a long tradition of personalized rule and considered by most Indonesians to be more appropriate than Western-style liberal democracy to a pluralistic and economically developing society. Under "pancasila democracy" most political power is vested in the President and in government departments under his authority. Parliament, the political parties, the press, and social organizations have a limited ability to influence government policy.

Indonesia's national ideology and five-year economic plans stress improved social welfare for all without discrimination, a goal incorporated in many Government economic development programs. Indonesia experienced an economic growth rate of about three percent in 1983 despite a continuing downturn in demand and prices for oil and other export commodities, its major foreign exchange earners.

The most significant human rights problem in Indonesia during 1983 was a countrywide campaign of covert, summary executions of criminals, euphemistically called "mysterious killings." Undertaken in response to burgeoning and increasingly violent crime, especially in Indonesia's urban centers, the "mysterious killings" during the year took the lives of large numbers of criminals with records of violent crime. Although there is no verifiable figure on the number of victims, Indonesian human rights groups have estimated that up to 4,000 may have been killed. Indonesian officials have offered conflicting accounts of the Government's involvement in this campaign, some acknowledging and others denying that security forces were responsible. Despite a sharp, temporary drop in the publicity accorded the campaign by the Indonesian media, there continued to be reports of killings throughout the year. Several friendly governments have expressed their concern over this issue to the Indonesian Government.

In East Timor, an ongoing focus of international human rights attention, there was a de facto ceasefire for much of the first half of the year. During that period, access for international organizations, journalists, diplomats, and others improved.

In addition, nearly 200 persons were permitted to leave the territory for Portugal and Australia under repatriation and family reunification programs. This was the largest legal emigration from East Timor since Indonesia incorporated the territory in 1976. In the second half of the year, however, the security situation in East Timor deteriorated after proindependence Fretilin elements broke the ceasefire. Officials stated that a new military campaign against the Fretilin insurgency would be undertaken. As a result, access

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to the territory for outside observers was again restricted by the Indonesian Government.

In addition during 1983, there were reports of the arrest and detention without trial of some persons alleged to have been involved in subversive or separatist activities, and in March the Government shut down a Jakarta newspaper, apparently for political reasons.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Unlawful or Arbitrary Deprivation of Life

In response to a marked increase in the number and violence of crimes and the failure of the courts and police to take effective action, beginning in late 1982 and continuing through much of 1983 an anticrime campaign was carried out, which included covert summary executions of criminals with records of violent crime. Because those carrying out the killings were initially not openly identified, the executions were labelled "mysterious killings" by the media and other observers.

At first confined to the island of Java, the killings spread to other parts of Indonesia. Media and other reports indicated that the campaign was most intense on Java and Sumatra. In early August, the Government banned further press reporting of the killings, and there were reports that the campaign had been ordered halted. Though the number of reported killings dropped off thereafter, there continued to be reports of executions throughout the year. There is no verifiable estimate of the total number of victims. In public statements, Government officials have indicated that "hundreds" were killed. Human rights groups which monitored the campaign claimed that there were up to 4,000 victims during 1983. Almost all those killed were persons who had themselves committed crimes; human rights groups remarked that political and opposition figures were not targeted. A very few cases of the killing of the "wrong" persons due to mistaken identity were reported. There was only limited public concern expressed over the anti-crime campaign; this concern was largely confined to the human rights organizations and to certain editors, academics, and government officials. As the campaign continued, however, there were increasing expressions of concern that it might get out of control.

In the course of the campaign, it became general knowledge that those killed were included on lists of criminals maintained by government security forces. In some instances spokesmen for the military and police alleged that criminals were shot while attempting to escape or while resisting arrest, and others allegedly were killed by angry crowds. Newspaper photos and other reports, however, indicated that many victims were shot at close range. While a number of Indonesian officials denied any government involvement, others acknowledged that security forces were responsible. In separate statements in July, for example, the Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament, the Director of its civilian intelligence agency, and a Deputy Chairman of the Government's Supreme Advisory Council defended

the campaign of killings and stated or implied that it was being carried out by security forces. Foreign governments have expressed strong concern to the Indonesian Government about the killings.

Groups outside Indonesia hostile to the 1976 takeover of East Timor charged in September that approximately 200 Timorese villagers were killed near the town of Viqueque, in retaliation for an August 8 Fretilin attack which killed 16 Indonesian Army engineers engaged in civic action work in Timor. Indonesian Government figures denied there had been any retaliatory killings.

ICRC session delayed till page 785 + wrong.

In addition to waging military attacks on government forces, Fretilin insurgents in the past have murdered government officials or individuals loyal to the Indonesian Government. Because of the extended de facto ceasefire in 1983, there reportedly were few, if any, such killings up to the breakdown of the ceasefire in August.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of the disappearance of political opposition figures during 1983. ← !! alive

c. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Government officials say they discourage torture and cruel punishment of prisoners, but cases of cruel treatment of prisoners are reported sporadically in the press. Where cases come to light, offending police and other authorities usually are disciplined. In an effort to reduce such incidents, top government security officials have pledged to institute a longterm program of more effective recruitment and training of better educated personnel. Courses taught at the National Police Academy now emphasize the need to be sensitive to prisoners' rights.

In July TAPOL, a London-based organization which is a strong critic of the Indonesian Government, published what was purported to be a "torture manual" prepared by military units serving in East Timor, containing instuctions for dealing with the Fretilin insurgency and references to third-degree interrogation methods. Indonesian officials denied the authenticity of the document, suggesting it was a forgery designed to sway international opinion about East Timor. There is no evidence of the authenticity of the document.

What about Amnesty?

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The December 1981 Criminal Procedures Code contains protections against arbitrary arrest and detention and specifies the right of prisoners to legal counsel and notification of family members. The provisions of the Criminal Procedures Code, however, are honored more often in urban areas than in small towns or remote provinces, in large part because of a shortage of trained trial lawyers and the weakness or absence of legal and human rights associations in remote areas. Press reports that many judges and prosecutors had failed to familiarize themselves with the Code led the Minister of Justice in late

1983 to exhort them to study and follow Code requirements or face disciplinary action.

Nevertheless, human rights and lawyers groups believe the Code has had a salutary effect. Implementing regulations issued in September established for the first time the right to substantial compensation for false arrest or imprisonment, and in the first case of its kind, lawyers won release of a client in October after legal authorities failed to adhere to the stipulation of the Code concerning prolongation of detention.

Martial law, declared in 1957, has not been lifted. Under special emergency provisions instituted in 1966, military authorities have wide powers to arrest and hold persons thought to endanger national security. These persons, usually accused of subversion, do not enjoy the protections offered under the Criminal Procedures Code.

According to reports from the press and human rights groups, during 1983 military authorities continued to arrest some individuals believed to be involved in subversion or separatist activities. In some cases persons detained are not allowed to contact their families or lawyers. They usually are permitted to communicate after a period of days or weeks.

Most of those detained for subversion are suspected Muslim extremists believed to have instigated or participated in illegal antigovernment acts. Human rights groups believe the number of such persons detained by military authorities rose just before the March reelection of President Soeharto.

Afterwards, the number is believed to have decreased. The most recent estimate from human rights observers is that approximately 400 suspected Muslim extremists are detained throughout Indonesia, most in the provinces of Aceh, East Java, and Central Java.

Members of separatist groups are also subject to detention without trial. Although precise estimates are unavailable, several dozen separatists are currently thought to be held without trial, especially in the province of Irian Jaya.

In East Timor, as of mid-1983, 14 persons were detained without trial in the Comarca Prison. Some international groups believe there are other detainees in military jails around East Timor and perhaps in Bali, but the allegation are unconfirmed. Since military operations commenced in September in response to Fretilin's breaking of the de facto ceasefire, groups outside East Timor say that many additional Fretilin supporters have been detained. Again, the charge is unproved.

so played down

Since 1981, Indonesian authorities have used Atauro Island off the coast of mainland East Timor as a detention facility for Timorese suspected of supporting or of having family members fighting with Fretilin. The number of Timorese detained on Atauro Island peaked at about 4,000 in the second half of 1982. In late 1982, working with the Indonesian Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the provincial government began to resettle detainees on the mainland. The number of detainees on Atauro dropped to around 2,800 by August 1983, when the resumption of fighting in East Timor brought what the Government says is a temporary halt to

the resettlement program. There are some reports that additional numbers of people have been detained on Atauro as a result of the renewed fighting in Timor. Nonetheless, Indonesian officials claim they are committed to closing the Atauro island facility and that they intend to permit all detainees to return to their homes at the earliest possible occasion.

At least one human rights group in Indonesia regards persons held for subversion as political prisoners, including those sentenced to prison through trial procedures. They believe the military organization responsible for detection and arrest of subversives and separatists, the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB), is extraconstitutional and therefore has no legal powers of arrest or the right to hand persons over for trial. Some of the detained persons clearly participated in acts of violence; others have been convicted for expressions of antigovernment or separatist sentiment. Although the Government has not announced data on the number of persons convicted and serving sentences for subversion, one estimate suggests there may be several hundred such prisoners.

Amnesty International contends that persons tried and convicted for participating in the abortive 1965 Communist coup and associating with the Indonesian Communist Party failed to receive fair trials and should be considered "political prisoners." There are about 250 such prisoners. Indonesian authorities have permitted visits to these prisoners by the ICRC, which normally urges that they be assured rights accorded other prisoners, including the right of appeal and routine remission of sentences.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Indonesia's criminal justice system lacks the number of courts, judges, prosecutors, and police needed to cope with the increase in crime in recent years and to assure every accused a speedy trial. Under Indonesian legal practice, the police are responsible for making arrests and conducting initial investigations. Information gained by the police is then turned over to a public prosecutor's office, where a determination is made whether to go to trial. Trials are conducted by a three-judge panel which hears evidence, decides guilt or innocence, and assesses punishment. Although the right of appeal is not absolute, it is observed in most cases; most court sessions are open and most defendants have access to counsel.

On occasion, there is either political interference in or corruption of the legal system. In criminal proceedings, defendants are sometimes able to buy their way out of prosecution at every stage of proceedings. In civil proceedings, court decisions are sometimes influenced by the payment of bribes. In response to these abuses, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice claim they are taking disciplinary action against some officials involved in corrupt activities and seeking to increase salaries and benefits for judicial officials, thereby reducing the incentive for corruption.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

Judicial warrants for searches are required except for suspected subversion, economic crimes, and corruption. In some instances forced or surreptitious entry by security agencies has been alleged. Both local and international phone calls by some individuals are probably monitored by government security agencies. Although in general correspondence is not monitored, all letter mail to and from East Timor is subject to censorship.

Permits are required for the import of foreign publications. Some foreign newspapers and magazines, especially from Australia, cannot be imported, and Communist or pornographic literature is prohibited. Foreign publications which do enter Indonesia are frequently censored.

Excepting one quasi-official daily newspaper which uses Chinese characters and claims a circulation of 120,000, Chinese language publications can neither be imported nor produced domestically. Chinese characters are routinely blotted out of foreign news photos and advertising. There are no laws against speaking Chinese, but the Government lays heavy stress on the learning and use of the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, to promote national unity. All school classes and most radio and television broadcasts employ Bahasa Indonesia.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Indonesia's Constitution leaves to Parliament the authority to prescribe limits on freedom of speech and press. In recent years, Parliament has helped create a body of law delimiting the rights of individuals and of the Governmnt. However, government agencies continue to exercise considerable discretionary authority in this area both through tradition and because of the absence of specific law protecting individual rights.

Opposition groups are generally free to meet and formulate views, but they often have difficulty disseminating their views publically because of media reluctance to risk official disapproval or because of informal government instructions not to publish the opinions of or news about prominent opposition figures. Nevertheless, there is a lively exchange of monographs, pamphlets, tape recordings, and other communications containing these views. Some prominent opposition figures claim harassment by government agencies (telephones rendered out of order, electricity cut, difficulty obtaining access to other government-provided services) and restrictions on their economic activities (e.g., refusal by government agencies to accept bids from companies in which they have an interest and pressure on private concerns not to do business with them).

Restrictions are sometimes imposed on academic inquiry during politically sensitive periods. School faculties sometimes refrain from producing materials, including dissertations, which they believe might provoke government displeasure. Informal restrictions on public universities' hiring of qualified young people who had participated in dissident student activities in the past were eased after the new Cabinet

was named in March 1983. In addition, several academics who had not been permitted to travel outside Indonesia to participate in professional meetings were once again allowed to travel in 1983.

The press in Indonesia is largely privately owned. While espousing a "free" press, the Government also expects the media to be "responsible" by supporting national economic development goals and domestic stability. Publishers and journalists, honoring what they perceive as the limits of permissibility, often exercise considerable "self-censorship." At the same time, the media is closely monitored, and editors routinely receive oral instructions from government officials about news which cannot be reported. Despite these limitations, the press can be lively and informative. Editorials frequently address sensitive issues, albeit gingerly, and news reports use allusion to provide information about events which are not supposed to be reported.

Many journalists welcomed the passage by Parliament in 1982 of a new press law, expected to reduce the likelihood of Government interference, including suspension of publication permits. Implementing regulations spelling out the rights and responsibilities of the press under the new law have not yet appeared, however, and the old law remains in effect. The new Minister of Information has hinted that even under the new press law, the Government will use the threat of closure to assure "responsible" reporting.

In addition, in March 1983 the security organization, KOPKAMTIB, ordered the suspension of publication of a Jakarta daily economic newspaper, which suspension remained in effect through the remainder of 1983. The suspension appears to have been motivated by political reasons.

which publication?

The Government is sensitive to foreign press reports of internal Indonesian developments, particularly those related to security and East Timor. As a result, it is selective in permitting foreign journalists to live and work in Indonesia.

Following the visit of Australian Prime Minister Hawke to Jakarta in June, the Indonesian Government permitted a representative of the Australian Associated Press to reside in Jakarta, thereby reversing a year-long prohibition against the fulltime presence of Australian journalists. During the first half of 1983 newsmen from Portugal, Australia, and Norway visited East Timor, but military operations against Fretilin elements prevented further journalistic travel to East Timor.

The Government occasionally stops publication or distribution of books regarded as critical of the government or on sensitive subjects. For instance, the 1982 Report on Human Rights Practices in Indonesia prepared by a local human rights organization, the Legal Aid Institute, has not been published because both the publisher and later a government agency considered it too critical.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Public assembly is freely permitted for social and ceremonial occasions and, as long as there is no perceived risk of violence, for political activities approved by the Government. Restrictions on assembly are sometimes tightened during periods

of higher political tension. Regional and national meetings of virtually all organizations were not authorized in the month before the reelection of President Soeharto. In 1983, the Minister of State for Youth and Sports established a new requirement that all youth organizations must agree to adopt the national ideology "pancasila" as their sole basic principle before they would be permitted to hold their national congresses.

not only youth organisations !

Indonesian labor is organized in a national federation (FBSI) composed of 21 national industrial unions, with a total membership of some three million out of a workforce of 65 million. FBSI is the only trade union body legally permitted in Indonesia. It is not permitted to organize civil servants or workers in government-owned enterprises and major sectors of the economy, although some professional organizations, such as those for teachers, do act as unions in some respects. Restrictions on FBSI's autonomy include the imposition of government-appointees in many of its positions, the requirement that its senior officials be active members of GOLKAR (the government party), extensive government intervention in labor-management relations, a government subsidy at the federation level, and strenuous government opposition to strikes. However, FBSI is slowly becoming more effective in representing its members, continually probing the limits of government tolerance as it does so. !

The law requires government permission for strikes, which as a matter of practice is never given. Nevertheless, localized, small-scale strikes frequently occur. The Government has sometimes threatened but seldom carried out physical repression of strikes. The Ministry of Manpower has also threatened in the past year to make strikes formally illegal.

In 1983 the Government became more involved in collective bargaining and labor agreements. High level officials have stated that the Government is taking steps to insure that Indonesian labor organizations adhere to Indonesian values and do not act like unions in developed "liberal democratic" countries.

Indonesia has signed and ratified a number of International Labor Organization conventions including the convention on the right to organize and bargain collectively. Government officials have made clear, however, that Indonesia's obligations under these conventions will not be allowed to interfere with "pancasila" labor relations. The Government believes that FBSI membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) would violate Indonesia's nonaligned foreign policy, but FBSI's general chairman participates in the ICFTU in his personal capacity, and its national industrial unions and a few professional groups have close relations with ICFTU's International Trade Secretariats. !

c. Freedom of Religion

Religious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution. Although the Indonesian population is overwhelmingly Muslim, no overt discrimination is directed against those of other faiths. The first tenet of "pancasila" specifies belief in the supreme being, so atheism is forbidden. Some animists in remote parts of Indonesia reportedly have been pressured to convert to Islam or Christianity in order to fulfill the requirement to believe in the supreme being. However, mystic sects and beliefs are followed by many in the Indonesian elite.

In October 1983, a small Muslim religious sect was banned by the Department of Religious Affairs because its teachings were regarded as having the potential to disrupt public order. The sect specifically rejected the validity of the "traditions" historically held to stem from the Prophet Mohammad.

There are no legal bars to religious conversion, and conversions between faiths are common. Proselytizing, though, is seen as potentially disruptive and is discouraged. For this reason, informal restrictions on the activities of foreign missionaries such as diffiulty in obtaining or renewing visas have been increasing in recent years. Official holidays include Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist as well as Muslim holy days.

Indonesian Muslims, Christians, and Buddhists maintain active links with coreligionists outside Indonesia. Travel to religious gatherings is not discouraged, and Muslims undertake the "haj" to Mecca without restriction. Foreign religious figures are welcomed, including the Dalai Lama in late 1982.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration and Repatriation

Movement within Indonesia is unrestricted, although there are exceptions. The Government requires permits to change residence in certain areas, primarily to control the further shift of population from rural to urban locations. Since 1958-59, ethnic Chinese have been denied the right to live in rural areas of Java (although the practical impact of the regulation is mitigated by the fact that no such rural area is more than 15 miles from a major town). Travel to certain areas, including most of eastern Indonesia, requires a special permit. There are also restrictions on movement to and within East Timor. Former political detainees associated with the abortive 1965 coup attempt are required to notify authorities of travel away from their homes.

Citizens who leave the country are guaranteed the right to return. The only exception is ethnic Chinese without citizenship documents who departed Indonesia before 1965.

Emigration is unrestricted except that, since the 1976 integration of East Timor into Indonesia, authorities have closely controlled emigration and repatriation of former Portuguese subjects. Despite agreements with the Australian Government and the ICRC, up to the end of 1982 only limited numbers of East Timorese left Indonesia legally. Many who did so had to pay substantial bribes. In 1983, however, officially sanctioned emigration from East Timor increased markedly. Through September, 109 persons were repatriated to Portugal under ICRC auspices, while an additional 79 persons left for Australia under a government-to-government family reunification program. These departures substantially reduced the number of persons who had previously indicated a desire to leave Indonesia permanently.

A few Indonesians remain in Communist countries where they chose to stay after the 1965 upheaval. The Government must give permission for them to return; such permission is determined on a case-by-case basis.

Under its humane refugee policy, Indonesia has given first

asylum to over 80,000 Indochinese refugees since 1975. In cooperation with the UNHCR, the Indonesian Government has also provided one of the region's two refugee processing centers, where Indochinese refugees from camps in Indonesia or other first asylum countries are given training to prepare them for permanent resettlement in other countries. Indonesia has not accepted any Indochinese refugees for permanent resettlement.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Indonesia has a limited representative government, with dominant political power held by active duty and retired military officers. President Soeharto is the decisive political figure. The Parliament and the political parties have limited ability to influence government decisions.

The Parliament is elected by all adult citizens except active duty members of the armed forces and convicted criminals serving in prison. Because the military is not permitted to vote, 96 out of 460 seats in Parliament are reserved for appointed members to represent its interests. Elections for Parliament are held every five years.

The President is elected by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which consists of the Parliament plus an equal number of appointed members and sits in a single special session once every five years. In March 1983, the MPR by acclamation selected President Soeharto for a fourth five-year term. Soeharto was nominated by all three political parties and there were no other candidates, although in theory any member of the MPR could have nominated anyone meeting the constitutional requirements for the presidency.

A 1975 law limits the number of political parties to three: a Muslim party made up of four former Muslim political parties; an association of former nationalist and Christian parties; and the government-sponsored party or "functional group" (GOLKAR). In three national elections since 1971, GOLKAR has won each time with more than 60 percent of the vote. Civil servants and their families are expected to vote for GOLKAR, and support for GOLKAR at the local level often results in additional government resources being devoted to development projects in the area.

Critics of the political system complain that the 1975 law on political parties substantially reduced freedom of association by forcing previously competitive political groupings into the Muslim and nationalist/Christian parties. They also contend that the leaderships of these parties are now more responsive to government interests than to the interests of their supporters. In his August 16, 1983, National Day address to Parliament, Soeharto acknowledged that the political parties are not expected to play adversary roles but to provide constructive suggestions to enhance government programs. The Speaker of Parliament stated on several occasions in 1983 that "liberal democracy" is inappropriate in the Indonesian setting.

The two political parties and GOLKAR are prohibited from organizing and operating below the district level except during election campaigns. Critics contend this system gives GOLKAR an advantage, since its civil service members have constant

access to small towns and villages because of their official duties. The Indonesian Communist Party and a formerly powerful Muslim party linked with separatist rebellions in the later 1950's are specifically banned. Members of the former and many leaders of the latter are not allowed to run for office or play active political roles.

An informal opposition group formed in 1980 and known as the Group of 50, consisting of retired military officers, some prominent Muslims, and former student activists, continues its efforts to exert political influence by circulating "statements of concern" critical of government leadership and policies.

The Javanese ethnic group has a preeminent role in the country's political leadership, as a result of its size (45 percent of the population) and historic and cultural factors. Other ethnic groups are represented at the highest levels of government, but non-Javanese ethnic groups are generally under-represented in the middle and lower levels of the military and bureaucracy.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The Government considers outside investigations of alleged violations of human rights to be interference in its internal affairs. Amnesty International representatives, for example, are refused official access to Indonesia because of the organization's past criticism of Government and the Government's belief that it is biased. There is no local chapter of Amnesty International, although individual citizens have memberships. In its 1983 report convering 1982, Amnesty International expressed concern on a number of points. These include the continued imprisonment of prisoners in connection with the alleged coup of October 1965, the length of prison terms imposed after unfair trials, the detention of other alleged political opponents of the Government, and reports of the detention without trial of increasing numbers of East Timorese and information corrobrating earlier of arbitary killings and "disappearances."

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a resident representative in Jakarta. In addition to visits to prisons and detention centers throughout Indonesia, the ICRC in conjunction with the Indonesian Red Cross engaged in a range of programs in East Timor. These include tracing, delivery of family messages, repatriation, a nutrition and health services program for displaced persons on Atauro Island, and relief for persons returning to the mainland from Atauro. Many of the ICRC activities in East Timor were suspended in August after the security situation deteriorated there, though some of those activities have now resumed.

a lie!

During the first half of 1983, other international groups (Catholic Relief Services, CRS, and the UN International Children's Emergency Fund, UNICEF) also had regular access to carry out programs in East Timor. In addition, the Government permitted greatly increased access by foreign journalists, diplomats, foreign government officials, and others. With the deterioration of the security situation after August, access of all groups became more difficult, although the government continued to allow limited access and indicated that it would lift restrictions when it is able to assure the security of visitors.

In late September, the United Nations postponed for one year consideration of any new General Assembly resolution on East Timor. (In 1982, the U.N. had adopted by a four-vote margin its seventh annual resolution expressing concern over the situation in East Timor and reaffirming the right of the people there to self-determination.)

Indonesia has a growing number of domestic organizations concerned with human rights. The Department of Justice has an agency charged with the drafting of legal codes to replace the colonial laws still in effect. This agency also has responsibility for the establishment of legal documentation facilities and for programs to inform citizens of their legal rights. In 1983, both judges and prosecutors paid visits to remote areas and villages to provide information about legal procedures. Also, there is a legal aid group associated with the government-backed political organization GOLKAR.

In addition to these government-related activities, private groups associated with mosques and churches are involved in providing legal counseling services. The Trial Lawyers Association, "Peradin," provides some legal services free to the disadvantaged.

Since 1973 the private, Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute has contested human rights violations by defending or representing aggrieved parties in court and by stimulating press attention and discussion. In 1983, the Institute spoke out against the "mysterious shootings" of criminals. It also protested the seizure without due process or adequate compensation of land in Central Java near the Borobudur Temple, to be used for a public park and tourist hotel. It also expressed support for the indigenous peoples of Irian Jaya, whose traditional concept of land use rights it said had been ignored in efforts to develop the region and exploit its resources. The Institute has established offices in many larger Indonesian cities, and it continues to draft annual reports on human rights, although the 1982 report, which is critical of the Government in parts, still has not been published. Freedom House described Indonesia as "partly free" in its 1983 report.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SITUATION

The fifth principle of the national ideology, "pancasila," is social justice, which is interpreted to mean that the basic human needs of all Indonesians should be satisfied without discrimination. In addition, the three "pillars" of President Soeharto's "New Order" government have been economic development, stability, and equity.

The worldwide economic downturn began to affect Indonesia significantly in the second half of 1982 and throughout 1983 with the prospect for a relatively long period of slower growth rates than were registered in the previous decade. The Government's countermeasures--including an austerity Government budget, currency devaluation and dramatic slowdown in implementation of some major industrial projects--will have at least short term, adverse consequences for such important government programs as health and education. In the 1984-89 Five Year Plan, Government planners stress small-scale, labor intensive projects and nonoil exports, aimed among other things at creating additional employment for swelling ranks of job seekers and thereby improving equity in income distribution.

Per capita Gross National Product was estimated by the World Bank to be $519 in 1981. Following the March 1983 devaluation of the rupiah, per capita income figures fell below $500.

The largest nation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia had an estimated population in 1983 of 160,932,000. Population pressures are especially great on the islands of Java, Bali, and Madura, even though the population growth rate has dropped below two percent according to Indonesian Government figures and stands at 2.1 percent according to World Bank statistics. Infant mortality rates improved to 92.7 per 1,000 live births in 1983. Likewise, life expectancy at birth rose to 53.08 in year 1980.

Indonesian women are important income earners for their families, and legislation guarantees them equal treatment. However, they still are not prominently represented in the national decisionmaking process. The Cabinet named in 1983 included two women, the Minister for Social Affairs and the Minister of State for Women's Affairs. Women's groups are active in development projects involving nutrition, family planning, and home economics. Indonesia's labor legislation has provisions protecting female wage earners, but women seldom receive equal pay for equal work.

Most ethnic Chinese have taken Indonesian citizenship, but they are resented by many other Indonesians because of their disproportionately prominent role in the economy. This resentment leads to some racial tension and periodic outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence. To help redress the economic imbalance between Chinese and indigenous entrepreneurs, the Government has followed programs discriminating in favor of the latter.

Ethnic Chinese are pressured to adopt Indonesian customs and take Indonesian names. While they are also encouraged to become citizens, some Chinese find legal avenues to citizenship blocked or are discouraged by the time-consuming and expensive task of obtaining citizenship documents. Government regulations prohibit the operation of all-Chinese schools and institutions of higher learning, teaching in Chinese languages, the formation of exclusively Chinese cultural groups and trade associations, and the use of Chinese characters on sign boards or in publications. Social and religious groups which are, in effect, all-Chinese, however, are not proscribed and do exist. Some largely Chinese organizations have had considerable influence in government affairs growing out of the informal ties of members to senior Government officials.

In 1978, 94 percent of all primary school-age children (virtually all males and 89 percent of females) were enrolled in schools. In 1984, the Government plans to make education compulsory up to the eighth grade. The World Bank estimated that as of 1971 total adult literacy stood at 56.6 percent (69.5 percent of men and 44.6 percent of women; 76.7 percent of urban dwellers and 52.2 percent of rural dwellers). According to the 1980 Government census, 72 percent of the population over 10 years of age could read and write (78.8 percent of men and 61.4 percent of women; 83.8 percent of the urban population and 65.7 percent of the rural population).

Agricultural output has increased significantly in recent years, about 3.8 percent per annum. Partly as a result, the percentage of caloric supply available for consumption relative to nutritional requirements rose to 101.71 in 1977.

Community health standards remain low. Tuberculosis and

U.S.OVERSEAS -LOANS AND GRANTS- OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS
(U.S.FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

COUNTRY: INDONESIA

	1981	1982	1983
I.ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	130.0	91.1	111.4
LOANS.....	78.9	59.1	85.3
GRANTS.....	51.1	32.0	26.1
A.AID	68.8	67.5	71.8
LOANS.....	33.9	43.3	53.8
GRANTS.....	34.9	24.2	18.0
(SEC.SUPP.ASSIST.)...	0.0	0.0	0.0
B.FOOD FOR PEACE.....	61.2	23.6	39.6
LOANS.....	45.0	15.8	31.5
GRANTS.....	16.2	7.8	8.1
TITLE I-TOTAL.....	45.0	15.8	31.5
REPAY. IN $-LOANS.....	45.0	15.8	31.5
PAY. IN FOR. CURR.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
TITLE II-TOTAL.....	16.2	7.8	8.1
E.RELIEF.EC.DEV & WFP.	7.7	3.1	3.6
VOL.RELIEF AGENCY.....	8.5	4.7	4.5
C.OTHER ECON. ASSIST...	0.0	0.0	0.0
LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
PEACE CORPS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
NARCOTICS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
OTHER.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
II.MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	32.2	42.2	27.4
LOANS.....	30.0	40.0	25.0
GRANTS.....	2.2	2.2	2.4
A.MAP GRANTS.....	0.4	0.0	0.0
B.CREDIT FINANCING....	30.0	40.0	25.0
C.INTL MIL.ED.TRNG....	1.8	2.2	2.4
D.TRAN-EXCESS STOCK...	0.0	0.0	0.0
E.OTHER GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
III.TOTAL ECON. & MIL...	162.2	133.3	138.8
LOANS.....	108.9	99.1	110.3
GRANTS.....	53.3	34.2	28.5
OTHER US LOANS.....	0.0	396.0	77.4
EX-IM BANK LOANS.....	0.0	396.0	77.4
ALL OTHER.....	0.0	0.0	0.0

ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

	1981	1982	1983	1946-83
TOTAL.....	1019.2	1394.2	1618.9	9362.3
IBRD	673.0	926.1	1329.9	6000.0
IFC	0.0	4.3	25.0	160.0
IDA	0.0	0.0	0.0	931.4
IDB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ADB	334.7	451.8	264.0	2071.0
AFDB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
UNDP	11.5	12.0	0.0	104.4
OTHER-UN	0.0	0.0	0.0	95.5
EEC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0